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WASHINGTON

LAW REVIEW
VOLUME X.

JANUARY, 1935

NUMBER 1

THE WASHINGTON PUBLIC UTILITY LEGISLATION OF
1933 BUDGET ORDERS AS RES JUDICATA
JOHN B. SHOLLEY*
The Washington legislature at its regular 1933 session enacted
a series of statutes radically altering the system of public utility
regulation in this state both in scope and method.' Recent years
have witnessed similar developments in several other states. ' As is
always the case with novel legislation, a number of questions of
statutory construction and of constitutional law have arisen. It
is the purpose of this paper to discuss one of the basic constitutional problems presented by the Washington legislation. Can
preliminary, fact-finding orders of a public service commission
which have been affirmed by the state courts be made conclusive
as to such facts in subsequent litigation? 3
The term "public utility" is applied to common carriers of all
kinds, electric light and power, gas, water, telephone and telegraph
companies, and similar businesses. These enterprises are subject
to public control in respect of service and rates. In all states except
Delaware the function of utility regulation has been delegated to
state administrative boards,4 which are usually authorized to fix
the rates which the utility companies may charge for their services
in order to protect the public from extortion and discrimination.
However, the interests of the utility companies may not be disregarded. It has been settled law since the case of Smyth v. Ames
was decided by the United States SuprOne Court in 1898 that a
public utility company is entitled to a "fair return upon the
value of that which it employs for the public convenience.'' 5 To
require it to accept less than that for its services and goods would
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington.

' Laws of 1933, Chaps. 148, 151, 152, 165. A general analysis and discussion of these statutes will appear in an early issue of this Review.
For a discussion from -the economist's viewpoint see Hall, Recent Developments in the Control of Public Utilities in the State of Washington,
10 Jour. Land & Pub. Utility Econ. 296 (1934).
2For a partial summary of such legislation see Hormell, State Legislation on Public Utilities in 1933, 28 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 84 (1934).
' Although the discussion will be almost entirely limited to the Washington legislation and cases and -federal cases, the conclusions are believed to be valid as to similar legislation in other states since the
problem is one arising under the United States Constitution.
IThese boards are usually called public service commissions. The
Washington board is called the Department of Public Works.
6169 U. S. 466, 547, 18 Sup. Ct. 418 (1898).
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be the taking of its property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Here then is a line beyond which the state, acting through its
commission, cannot go in seeking to protect its citizens as consumers. But how is the line to be drawn?
Mr. Justice Brandeis in his well-known concurring opinon in
the Southwestern Bell case has aptly summarized the process
which has been sanctioned by the Supreme Court
"To decide whether a proposed rate is confiscatory the
tribunal must determine both what sum would be earned
under it and whether that sum would be a fair return.
The decision involves ordinarily the making of four subsidiary ones
" (1) What the gross earnings from operating the utility under the rate in controversy would be. (A prediction.)
" (2) What the operating expenses and charges, while
so operating, would be. (A prediction.)
" (3) The rate base, that is, what the amount is on
which a return would be earned. (Under Smyth v Ames,
an opinion, largely )
"(4) What rate of return should be deemed fair. (An
opinion, largely )
"A decision that a rate is confiscatory (or compensatory) is thus the resultant of four subsidiary determinations. "'
Ordinarily the utility company can have a commission's rate
order set aside as confiscatory by convincing the court that the
commission's finding as to any one of the four factors is erroneous.7 All are vitally important, since all are direct factors in the
result.
As may be imagined, the Washington Department of Public
Works, in common with other public service commissions, was
faced with serious difficulties in attempting to regulate rates effectively Valuations and investigations were slow and costly, and
hence could be conducted only at rare intervals as to any particular utility company The rate schedule when fixed operated prospectively only, the fruits of excessive charges in the past were
Missourz ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Go. v. Public Serviee
Con mtsson of M11issourt, 262 U. S. 276, 291, 43 Sup. CL 544 (1923).
' Of course the error must be substantial and prejudicial to the utility
company. Recently the Supreme Court has taken the view that an error
prejudicial to the company may be compensated by a beneficial error*
the net result of all the errors must be confiscatory before the company
can prevail. Los Angeles Gas & Electrsc Corp. v. Railroad Comrnwsszon,
289 U. S. 287, 53 Sup. Ct. 637 (1933).

PUBLIC UTILITY LEGISLATION
beyond reach." Business conditions changed more rapidly than
the Department could change rates. Rates which were too low one
year might be unreasonably high the next. The expense and delay
of litigation9 and the danger of judicial nullification tended to
discourage the Department from attempting to effect substantial
rate reductions. 0
The legislation of 1933 was designed to lessen these difficulties
by providing a system of continuous rate regulation. The device
employed is termed an "excess earnings reserve." Chap. 165, See.
14, Laws of 1933, provides.
"If any public service company earns in any year a
net operating income in excess of a reasonable rate of
return upon the fair value of its property used and useful
in the public service, such excess shall be placed in a
reserve fund. Such reserve fund shall from time to time
and under rules and regulations prescribed by the department and upon its order, be applied in whole or in part
as earnings of such public service company m any subsequent year or years in which it does not earn a reasonable rate of return, or in establishing, replenishing or
maintaining amortization, depreciation or other contingent funds, or for any other purpose beneficial to the
consumers of such public service company "I
The accumulation of such reserves will decrease jmaterially the
likelihood of successful court attacks on future rate reductions by
the Department, and will tend to protect the common stockholders
against violent fluctuations in the dividend rate. Any injustice to
consumers will be slight since they are a relatively stable group
who will themselves benefit in the future from any excess in rates
they may pay presently With the acquisition in course of time of
a fund of accurate data derived from actual experience, the D.epartment should find itself in a position to stabilize rates at figures
fair to all parties.
8 "Profits of the past cannot be used to sustain confiscatory rates for
the future." Board of Public Utility Con'rs. v. N. Y. Telephone Co., 271 U.
S. 23, 32, 46 Sup. Ct. 363 (1926). This statement was made in the absence
of a statutory excess earnings reserve. Cf. note 11, snfra.
0 An extreme example of "the law's delay" is the Chicago telephone rate
litigation, begun in 1923 and ended, let us hope, with the decision in
Ltndhermer v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 292 U. S. 151, 54 Sup. Ct. 658
(1934), after eleven years of continuous litigation in state and federal
courts.
"0For an exhaustive survey of the difficulties of rate regulation and
various suggestions for their elimination see the Report of the New York
State Commission on the Revision of the Public Service Commission Laws
(1930).
" Rem. Rev. Stat., 1933 Supp., § 10458-8. The constitutionality of
such a reserve seems assured in light of Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. Co. v.
U. S., 263 U. S. 456, 44 Sup. Ct. 169 (1924) upholding the "recapture" of
excessive railroad earnings by the Interstate Commerce Commission. o.

note 8, supra.
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To insure that this earnings reserve shall amount to more than
an entry m its own books, the Department has been given control
over the payment of dividends by utility operating companies
"No public service company engaged in intrastate business in this state shall pay any dividend upon its common
stock until
"1. The public service company's earnings and earned
surplus are sufficient to declare and pay the same after
provisions are made for reasonable and proper reserves.
"Before any common stock dividend is paid, the public service company shall make application to the department for approval thereof, and shall furnish to the department such information and 12data relating thereto as
the department shall require.'

By operating on the pocketbooks of the stockholders, this provision enables the Department to put considerable indirect pressure on utility managers to confine the outlays of their companies
to such items as have been approved by the Department under the
budget control statute described below Moreover there will be
less incentive to resist proposed ralte reductions if no change in
the existing dividend rate will follow
The effective use of the earnings reserve device requires that
the Department be in a position to determine what amount will
represent a fair return to the utility company each year. The
gross earnings froim operations will of course be readily ascertainable, and the rate of return regarded as "fair" should give little
trouble,13 but the other two factors, the rate base and proper operating expenses, are much more difficult to determine. Without new
machinery for this purpose the entire system would break down
due to the time consumed in conducting annual investigations, if
for no other reason.
By the Public Service Commission Law of 1911, the Washington Commission (now called the Department of Public Works)
was ordered to make valuations of the property of every public
utility company used for the convenience of the public within the
state, which valuations, subject to adjustment for additions and
depreciation, were made "conclusive" in all subsequent proceedings before the commission except insofar as a change in conditions
could be shown. 14 Once the laborious task of evaluating a com"Laws of 1933, Ch. 165, §11, Rem. Rev. Stat., 1933 Supp., §10458-5.
seems to be the rate of return favored by commissions and
courts under present conditions. Los AngeZes Gas & E. Corp. v. Railroad
Conzvzssson, supra, note 7. Dayton Power & L. Co. v. Public Utilities Cornmtssson, 292 U. S.290, 54 Sup. Ct. 647 (1934).
URem. Rev. Stat. §10441.
161/2-7%
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pany's property was completed, the commission was in a position
to find the rate base as of any given time by merely making the
necessary corrections. Neither the company nor the commision
could assail the accuracy of the original valuation at any later
time. "
This statute was repealed in 1933 and replaced by one which
permits the Department to make valuations and revaluations at
any time on its own motion. 16 Probably the chief purpose of this
change was to give the Department a free hand unshackled by old
valuations now regarded as too favorable to the utility companies.'
There is now no provision making the valuation findings conclusive. 8 A utility company can always dispute the Department's
findings as to its rate base in any rate or dividend proceeding. Of
course this does not mean that a valuation made in the past will be
of no value; if it is accurate to begin with and is properly revised,
it will withstand the attack of the company
The new statutes provide for a determination of the amounts
properly chargeable to operating expense m advance. Before
November first of each year each utility company is required to
submit to the Department its proposed annual budget for the next
year. The Department is authorized to reject such items as may,
after notice and hearing, be found unfair, unreasonable, or "contrary to public interest." The utility company may make any
rejected items of expenditure if it sees fit, but such outlays may not
be allowed as charges to operating expense for the purpose of
determining the net operating income of the company for that
year. Provision is made for adjustments during the year by
means of supplemental budgets. 9
Special attention is given to contracts between utility operating
companies and so-called "affiliated interests," defined very
"IState ex rel. Spokane v. Katykendall, 119 Wash. 107, 205 Pac. 3 (1922).
But obvious errors might be correc-ted. State ex rel. Pacific P & L. Co. v.
Dept. of Public Works, 143 Wash. 67, 254 Pac. 839 (1927).
0 Laws of 1933, Ch. 165, §4, Rem. Rev. Stat, 1933 Supp. §10441.
" The Department Is now in a position to use present cost of reproduction as an Index of value, which figure, due to the depression, will
frequently be substantially smaller than original cost less depreciation,
-the Index prescribed by the old statute. See cases cited supra, note 15.
IThe general statute, Rem. Rev. Stat. §10448, making all departmental
orders conclusive where no review has been sought, or, if sought, no
reversal has been secured, probably does not apply. An order which is
not conclusive on the Department should not be on the company. Moreover, It Is a case of a new special statute replacing an old speial statute
which had its own provision as to finality.
"Laws of 1933, Ch. 165, §15, Rem. Rev. Stat, 1933 Supp. §10458-4.
Excessive executive salaries, political advertising, and membership fees
in trade associations whose principal functions are lobbying and propagandizing are probably the items aimed at by this section.
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broadly by the statute. Each contract of this type must be approved by the Department before expenditures made thereunder
may be charged to operating expense.2" The Department is also
given express authority to fix the annual depreciation charges and
prescribe the method of depreciation accounting of each utility
company 21
By means of these devices the Department is calculated to be in
a position to determine the operating expenses and the rate base
of a utility company at the end of each year so that a proper adjustment of the earnings reserve can be made. Moreover, past
findings and orders as to budget items will prove helpful in estimating future operating expenses when the Department undertakes to adjust rate schedules.
A simple hypothetical example will perhaps best illustrate the
new system of regulation. Let us assume that a certain utility
operating company has a rate base of $1,000,000, is capitalized at
the same figure, 21a and has neither surplus nor deficit. It submits
its annual budget for 1935, calling for the expenditure of $200,000, to the Departinent in the fall of 1934. The Department disallows items totaling $50,000, and this order is affirmed by the
courts, but the company goes ahead and spends the entire $200,000 as planned. The gross revenue from operations in 1935 is
$270,000. According to the company's books its net profit will be
$70,000, but the Department's books will show a profit of $120,000.
If we assume that 7% is a fair rate of return, the Department will
order the company to set up an excess earnings reserve of $50,000
at the close of the year 1935.22
Now suppose the company wishes to declare a dividend and
seeks the permission of the Department. The latter will allow a
dividend of only $20,000.22 To the complaints of the stockholders
it could reply, "True, your company actually earned $120,000 last
year, but it must hold $50,000 in trust for the benefit of its customers whom it overcharged to that extent, and your managers
saw fit to spend another $50,000 of your dividend money on adver
tising that was not needed, on salaries which were not earned, and
"'

Laws of 1933, Ch. 152; Rem. Rev

Stat., 1933 Supp. §10440-1-

10440-10. The "milking' of operating companies by their holding companies to the detriment of both consumers and minority stockholders by
means of service and supply contracts is the evil aimed at here.
"Laws of 1933, Ch. 165, §13; Rem. Rev. Stat., 1933 Supp. §10458-7.
" For the sake of simplicity it is supposed that all of the capital furnished is represented by common stok. Actually this is rarely if ever,
true.
2--The statute, supra, note 11, apparently leaves the Department no
discretion where excessive earnings are found.
Here again the statute, supra, note 12, is mandatory in form.
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to the- holding company for technical services and expert advice
which were never rendered. It is not our fault that your dividends
are so small. We did all we could to save your noney- Perhaps
" And into court they go.
a new set of managers
Suppose the same thing happens the next two years. The Department would then be in a position to reduce rates about 25%
with little fear of judicial reversal provided the findings as to
proper operating expenses for the past three years will be accepted by the courts as the correct basis for estimating future
operating expenses. Furthermore, a rate reduction of 30% might
be upheld if the courts agree with the Department that conditions
more favorable to the company will obtain m the future. The
temporary confiscatory effect of the lower rates could be offset by
dipping into the excess earnings reserve provided the courts would
sustain the Department in its contention that such funds do represent excessive earnings.
In all three of these situations the weight to be accorded the
Department's budget orders is of vital importance. If they are
deemed conclusive, then, assuming the constitutionality of other
features of the new system, the finding as to the rate base will be
the only vulnerable point in the Department's case. But if budget orders are to be regarded as only prima facie correct,2 ' the
whole scheme of continuous regulation will be jeopardized. Each
dividend and rate order will entail the litigation of the issues of
past operating expense. The utility companies will ignore the
budget proceedngs and wait until rate or dividend proceedings
are instituted to put in their evidence and arguments. The Department will have nothing certain on which to base future action,
and will be in little better position than before 1933 as to flt
fixing of rates.
The statute clearly contemplates that budget orders which have
been affirmed by the courts shall be conclusive in subsequent litigation.
"Any public service company may, at its option make
or contract for any rejected item of expenditure, but in
such case the same shall not be allowed as an operating
expense,
"Any finding and order made and entered by the department as herein provided shall be and remain in full
force and effect, unless and until the findings and order of
the department with respect thereto have been vacated
25
and set aside in proper proceedings for review thereof."
" Rem. Rev. Stat. §10449 makes all findings of fact made by the Deparment prima facie correct and casts the burden of proof on the party disputing such findings in any review proceeding.
Laws of 1933, Chap. 165, §10; Rem. Rev. Stat., 1933 Supp. §10458-4.
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The review referred to is that provided by a general statute
applicable to all orders of the Department. It provides that any
person affected by a departmental order may petition the superior
court for a writ of review within thirty days of the issuance of
the order. The reviewing court is limited to the record made by
the Department and can reverse only for error of law 26 Another
general statute provides that all orders issued by the Department
shall be final and conclusive unless set aside in a review proceedrag.2 Thus failure to petition for a writ of review within thirty
days from the issuance of an order will preclude a party from
ever attacking such order later.2 8 Since payments under "affiliated" contracts and depreciation charges will appear as items in the
general budget, the finality of departmental orders in respect of
them involves no different problem.
The question now arises, are these statutes purporting to make
budget orders 29 conclusive constitutional q The "due process" clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment insures to every man his "day in
court." The doctrine of res 3udicata limits him to one day, but of
course cannot apply until he has had that day Hence the issue
must be of a justiciable nature, that is, of the type customarily decided by courts of justice.30 In other words, if the appropriate court
will not take jurisdiction to determine an issue, the doctrine of
res judicata cannot apply
A public service commission issues many kinds of orders, some
of which are not reviewable.31 Others, e.g., rate orders, clearlv are.
All courts will not draw the line at the same place. The Washington courts have been very liberal in granting reviews. The
Rem. Rev. Stat. §10428, See State ex rel. Oregon R. & Nay. Co. v.
Railroad Com., 52 Wash. 17, 100 Pac. 179 (1909).
', Rem. Rev Stat. §10448.
'This raises a constitutional problem distinct from the one which is
under discussion. Can a quasi-judicial determination of any fact by an
administrative body be treated as res judicata in the absence of judicial
affirmation by a court? This problem is beyond the scope of this paper.
Cf. note 47 snfra. The Washington court has applied the statute with no
hesitation. State ex rel. RailroadCom. v. Great Northern R. Co., 68 Wash.
257, 123 Pac. 8 (1912) State ex rel. Great Northern R. Co. v. Public Service Corn., 76 Wash. 625, 137 Pac. 132 (1913) State ex rel. Pacific P & L.
Co. v. Public Service Com., 81 Wash. 24, 142 Pac. 431 (1914).
-' The term "budget order" is used to designate an order disallowing
items in a budget submitted by a utility company Ordinarily it will be
made in advance of the proposed expenditures.
IMr. Justice Stone's opinion in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace,
288 U. S. 249, 53 Sup. Ct. 345 (1933) contains an excellent discussion and
analysis of this problem.
I Order setting date for hearing, United States v. Illinois Cent. R. R.
Co., 244 U. S. 82, 37 Sup. Ct. 584 (1917) order fixing tentative valuation
prior to hearing, Delaware & Hudson Co. v. United States, 266 U. S. 438,
order authorizing lease of operating property,
45 Sup. Ct. 153 (1925)
Fishback v. Public Ser Corn., 193 Ind. 282, 138 N. E. 346 (1923).
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objection that only final orders are judicially reviewable -was
raised in an early case and was answered by the court as follows.
"Appellants argue that the words 'any order,' as used
in sec. 86, should be interpreted to mean only final orders.
This contention is disposed of in State ex rel. Railroad
Cann sion v. Oregon R. & Nay. Co., 68 Wash. 160, 123
Pac. 3, where it was held that the provisions of this section
are so plain as to admit of no argument as to their meanmng. The legislature has not limited the right of review to
final orders, but has conferred that right, and fixed a
limit within which it may be exercised, upon any order
of the commission which is deemed contrary to law, 'for
the purpose of having its reasonableness and lawfulness
inqmred into and determined.' That the legislature has a
right to provide for the review of any order must be admitted, and when it has in express terms done so, it is not
for the courts to say that such review should be, not from
any order as in the language of the act, but only from
any final order. This would mean a judicial amendment
of the act which, doubting our power, we are not disposed
to make. "s 2
The cases nearest in point to the problem under discussion
arose under the valuation statute of 1911." On at least one occasion a department valuation order standing alone was reviewed
by both superior and supreme courts of this state.3 4 Such an
order is similar to a budget order in nature and effect, neither
purports to interfere with the utility company presently in any
substantial manner. Judging by their action in the above cases,
it would seem likely that the courts of Washington will grant immediate reviews of budget orders, so that they can be treated as
res judicata insofar as the state constitution is concerned, unless
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court induce a change
in attitude.
That this danger is very real will appear shortly At this point
it might be interesting, by way of contrast, to present the atti-

tude of the United States Supreme Court toward judicial review
of valuation orders. By Act of Congress in 1913 the Interstate
2 State ex rel. Great Northern R. Co. v. Publi Ser Con., 76 Wash. 625,
629, 137 Pac. 132 (1913). Cf. State ex rel. Pacific P & L. Co. v. Public Ser
Con., 81 Wash. 24, 142 Pae. 431 (1914) holding nonreviewable an indefinite preliminary order.
Notes 14 and 15, supra, and text thereto.
Colunmbia River Tel. Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 148 Wash. 395, 269
Pae. 6 (1928). See also City of Everett v. Dept. of Public Works, 125
Wash. 341, 215 Pae. 1045 (1923), and discussion thereof in State ex rel.
Pacific P & L. Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 143 Wash. 67, 76-8, 254 Pac.
839 (1927).
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Commerce Commission was ordered to make valuations of all interstate railroads, which were to be regarded as pmma facte evidence of value in future rate-fixing proceedings.35 In United States
v. Los Angebes & S. L. R. Co.36 the Supreme Court held it error
for a district court to undertake to review such a valuation order. 7
The following remarks are significant, especially so coming from
Mr. Justice Brandeis who delivered the opinion
"The so-called order here complained of is one which
does not grant or withhold any authority, privilege, or
license, which does not extend or abridge any power or
facility, which does not subject the carrier to any liability, civil or criminal, which does not change the carrer's existing or future status or condition, which does
not determine any right or obligation. This so-called
order is merely the formal record of conclusions reached
after a study of data collected in the course of extensive
research conducted by the Commission, through its employees. It is the exercise solely of the function of investigation. Compare Smith v Interstate Commerce Commission, 245 U S. 33, 38 Sup. Ct. 30, 62 L. Ed. 135. Moreover,
the investigation made was not a step in a pending proceeding, in which an order of the character of those held
to be judicially reviewable could be entered later. It was
merely preparation for possible action in some proceeding which may be instituted in the future-preparation
deemed by Congress necessary to enable the Commission
to perform adequately its duties, if and when occasion
for action shall arise. The final report may, of course,
become a basis for action by the Commission, as it may
become a basis for action by Congress or by the Legislature or an administrative board of a state. But so may
any report of an investigation, whether made by a committee of Congress or by the Commission pursuant to a
resolution of Congress or of either branch thereof.
"And it is at least possible that no proceeding will ever
be instituted, either before the Commission or a court, in
which the matters now complained of will be involved, or
in which the errors alleged will be of legal significance."3
True, this case is readily distinguishable from the Washington
cases 9 which involved valuation orders that were made final and
conclusive in subsequent litigation by express terms of the statute.
Here the railroad could attack the valuation fixed at any future
27 Stat. 701, 48 U. S. C. A. §19a.
•
"273 U. S. 299, 47 Sup. Ct. 413 (1927).

"The

statute confers on the District Courts jurisdiction of "cases

brought to enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend in whole or in part any
order" of the Commission. 36 Stat. 542, 28 U. S. C. A. §46.
273 U. S. 299, 309-10, 311.
"Cited supra, note 34.
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time. Nevertheless, the implications of the opinion are broad
enough to justify the assertion that the Supreme Court does not
consider preliminary fact-finding orders as fit subjects for adjudication. Such an order does not present a justiciable controversy,
the utility company has not been hurt as yet, 0 and may never
be. The Commission may never fix the rates at all, they may be
fixed at a figure high enough to provide a fair return on the conpany's own valuation, or changed conditions may destroy the
probative value of the order itself.
There is nothing in the United States Constitution to stop theWashington courts from reviewing preliminary budget orders if
they wish to, but the United States Supreme Court may hold that
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits treating such orders, even
after they have been affirmed by the state courts, as res 3udicata
in subsequent rate or dividend litigation. The Court has more
than once stated by way of dictum that the doctrine of res 3udicata
cannot apply in similar situations because the court which decided
the issue was not sitting as a court. Review by a court is not
enough. It must be a judictal review by a court.
The leading case on this proposition is Prentss v. Atlantic Coast
Ltne Co.,41 decided by the Supreme Court in 1908. The case arose
on appeal from the federal circuit court which had enjoined the
Virginia Corporation Commission from enforcing its order fixing
passenger fares. These rates had been fixed after notice and a
full hearing. The state constitution granted the right to appeal
directly from the commission to the supreme court of appeals, and
authorized that court, should it reverse the order, to substitute
the order which should have been issued. The Court held first,
that the action was not improper as an attempt to enjoin a legislative or judicial body, since it was brought to enjoin the members
of the commission froin enforcing a rate already fixed, an executive act, second, that it was improper for the court to act until
the legislative process of fixing the rate was completed, 42 referring
to the possibility that the state court might change the rate should
the carrier resort to it, and third, that the circuit court should
retain jurisdiction to protect the carrier in case the state courts
should refuse to grant him any relief. It is the dicta uttered by
0

, In the Los Angeles case the Court held that the carrier could not
invoke the general equity jurisdiction of the District Court on the ground
that the publication of an unreasonably low valuation finding would injure
its credit with the public. Op. cit., supra, note 36, 314.
41211 U. S. 210, 29 Sup. Ct. 67 (1908).
For a discussion of the subsequent history of this doerine see Merrifield, The Federal Injunction and State Commissions: The Rule of the
Prentis case, 1 Univ. of Chicago L. Rev. 777 (1934).
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Mr. Justice Holmes in the course of his opinion that are of par
ticular significance in connection with our problem.
"A judicial inquiry investigates, declares, and enforces
liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under
laws supposed already to exist. That is its purpose and
end. Legislation, on the other hand, looks to the future
and changes existing conditions by making a new rule, to
be applied thereafter to all or some part of those subject
to its power. The establishment of a rate is the making
of a rule for the future, and therefore is an act legislative,
not judicial, in kind.
"The nature of the final act determines the nature of
the previous inquiry As the judge is bound to declare the
law, he must know or discover the facts that establish
the law So, when the final act is legislative, the decision
which induces it cannot be judicial in the practical sense,
although the questions considered might be the same that
would arise in the trial of a case. If a state constitution
should provide for a hearing before any law should be
passed, and should declare that it should be a judicial
proceeding tn rem and the decision binding upon all the
world, it hardly is to be supposed that the simple device
could make the constitutionality of the law res judicata,
if it subsequently should be drawn in question before a
court of the United States. And all that we have said
would be equally true if an appeal had been taken to the
supreme court of appeals and it had confirmed the rate.
Its action in doing so would not have been judicial, although the questions debated by it might have been the
same that might come before it as a court, and would have
been discussed and passed upon by it in the same way that
it would deal with them if they arose afterwards in a case
properly so called.
Legislation cannot bolster itself
up in that way Litigation cannot arise until the moment
of legislation is past.
"If the rate should be affirmed by the supreme court
of appeals and the railroads still would regard it as confiscatory, it will be understood from what we have said
that they will be at liberty then to renew their application
to the circuit court, without fear of being met by a plea
'4
of res judicata."
The rule is simple to state, but very difficult to apply Regardless of the form of the proceeding, whether before a commision
or a court of last resort, no determination of an issue of fact, says
Mr. Justice Holmes, made prior to the completion of the legislative process can be res judicati in later litigation. The difficulty
in application arises in trying to ascertain the precise moment
'

Op. cit. supra, note 41, 226, 227-8, 230.
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at which legislation ceases.44 In fact the Prentis case itself is an
excellent illustration of this. If "litigation cannot arise until
the moment of legislation is past" and the state court of review
is a part of the legislative machinery, then a bill brought to enjoin the commission, before the time allowed for an appeal has
expired (as this one was), would be premature and could not be
entertained. But the Court specifically ordered the bill retained,
which indicates that the words quoted were not intended to carry
a broad and literal meaning. Suppose the federal court's injunction had issued prior to the expiration of the period allowed for
appeal to the state court,45 and no appeal had been taken from
the federal court. Would not its decree be res 3udicata as to the
issue of confiscation 9 Probably the point is that as to the commsssion the moment of legislation had passed when it issued its final
rate-fixing order.
A further complication is introduced by the fact that a public
service commission ordinarily performs a judicial function, as well
as those of legislation and execution. 4 The hearing, which chronologically precedes the act of legislation and hence would offhand
appear to be a preliminary act of investigation, is treated by the
courts as the first step in the process of adjudicating the lawfulness of the rates fixed.47 It is regarded as if it took place after,
instead of before, the promulgation of the rate order. A similar
situation is presented by a "legislating" court like the Virginia
court in the Prentis case. It conducts a judicial inquiry before
acting. Here again it is treated as subsequent. Mr. Justice Holmes
intimated in the Prentis case that a writ of error to the Virginia
Court of Appeals would have been issued by the United States
Supreme Court had the carrier pursued his remedy in the state
"'"It Is difficult, if not impossible, to define at what point in cases
like this the reviewing power of an appellate court enters the legislative
field." Aetna Ins. Co. v. Commonwaelth, 168 S. E. 859, 866 (Va., 1933).
The court Is discussing the Prentis case.
,"This will be done to prevent "daily confiscation" where the state
statutes do not provide for a stay on appeal. Pacific Te~ephone & T. Co.
v. Kuykendall, 265 U. S. 196, 204-5, 44 Sup. Ct. 553 (1924).
See Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison T. & S.F R. Co., 284 U. S.370,
52 Sup. Ct. 183 (1932) for the distinction between these functions.
"Cf. the contention in the Prentis case, supra, note 41, that the injunction was bad as an attempt to restrain a state court. Thus under the
Washington statute, supra,note 26, the Department's function is similar
to that of a master in chancery, and the reviewing court may constitutionally be limited to the record made by it. Washington ex rel. Oregon
1. & Nay. Co. v. Fairchild,224 U. S.510, 32 Sup. Ct. 535 (1912). But a
commission cannot take the place of a oourt. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v.
Minnesota, 134 U. S.418, 10 Sup. Ct. 462 (1890), holding invalid a statute
making final the determination of a commission as to the lawfulness of
rates fixed by itself, as depriving the carrier of its day in court. Cf.
note 28, supra.
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courts without success. 4 If so, then the Virginia court would have
been acting judicially-because the United States Supreme Court
9
refuses to review the decrees of a court which is not so acting and it is difficult to understand why its decision should not be
regarded as res 3udicata.
It is well settled that a state court which has merely the power
to affirm or reverse the decision of a commission is acting judicially
when reviewing the latter's orders, and the doctrine of res udicata
applies.9 0 In Grubb v. Public Utilitses Commssswn of Ohao,51 the
decision of the Ohio Supreme Court affirming a commission order
denying an application for a permit to operate a bus line was
held to be res 3udicata as to all issues which might have been
decided, thus abating an action between the same parties which
was pending in a federal court, and this despite the fact that
the Ohio court was acting under a statute authorizing it to
reverse, vacate, or modify orders issued by the commission. 52 The
Supreme Court seemed satisfied with the Ohio court's previous
assertion that it acted only judicially in such cases.53
In addition to the practical and logical difficulties presented by
the dictum in the Prentts case ("Litigation cannot arise until the
moment of legislation is past."), its application would be inconsistent with that spirit of comity between state and federal courts
so much stressed in the Prents ease itself. To disregard entirely
the solemn and careful decision of the highest court in a state
on the identical issue would not tend to promote a feeling of
mutual goodwill and respect.
For one reason or another the Supreme Court has not seemed
eager to apply the dictum of the Prentss case, and were it not for
a case decided last term, it might plausibly be contended that it
would not be applied to judgments affirming preliminary budget
orders. The case referred to, State Corporation Commission v.
Wichita Gas Co.,54 was an appeal from the decree of a federal dis48 op. cit., supra, note 41, 228. This proposition is the basis of the
specially concurring opinions of Fuller, . J., and Harlan, J., in the
Prentis case.
49Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U. S. 428, 43 Sup. Ct. 445
(1923) FederalRadio Com. v. General Electric Co., 281 U. S. 464, 50 Sup.
Ct. 389 (1930).
1 Detroit & Mackinac R. Co v. Michigan R. Con., 235 U. S. 402, 35
Sup. Ct. 126 (1914) Napa Valley Elec. Co. v. Railroad Cor., 251 U. S. 366,
40 Sup. Ct. 174 (1920).
281 U. S. 470, 50 Sup. Ct. 374 (1930).
See incidental mention of this point in opinion, ibid., 477.
13Ib~d., 474.
U290 U. S. 561, 54 Sup. Ct. 321 (1934). See also New York Telephone
Co. v. Maltbie, 291 U. S. 645, 54 Sup. Ct. 443 (1934).
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trict court" enjoining the Kansas commission from enforcing its
order disallowing certain- payments under an "affiliated" contract
as operating expenses. The Kansas statutese purporting to make
such orders, when not appealed from or when affirmed, final in
subsequent rate proceedings are substantially the same as the corresponding statutes in Washington. 7 The Supreme Court vacated
the injunction, reasoning as follows.
"Appellees, in substance, suggest that, unless now adjudged invalid and enjoined, the findings and directions
of the commission in respect of their operating expenses
and the fixing of rates will be binding upon them in later
proceedings for the prescribing of rates to be charged by
them for gas furnished to consumers and in suits involving the validity of such rates. But the commission's proceedings are to be regarded as having been taken to secure
information later to be used for the ascertainment of
reasonableness of rates. The order is therefore legislative
in character. The commission's decisions upon the matters
covered by it cannot be res adjudicata when challenged in
a confiscation case or other suit involving their validity
or the validity of any rate depending upon them. Prentis
v Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210, 227, 29 Sup. Ct. 67, 53
L. Ed. 150, Chicago, etc., Railway Co. v. Minnesota, 134
U. S. 418, 452 et seq., 10 Sup. Ct. 462, 33 L. Ed. 970. But
the decisions of state courts reviewing commission orders
making rates are res adjudicata and can be so pleaded in
suits subsequently brought in federal courts to enjoin
their enforcement. Detroit & Mackinac Ry v. Mieh. R. R.
Comm., 235 U. S. 402, 405, 35 Sup. Ct. 126, 59 L. Ed. 288,
Napa Valley Co. v R. R. Comm., 251 U. S. 366, 373, 40
Sup. Ct. 174, 64 L. Ed. 310.
"It results, therefore, that appellees in their complaints
failed to state facts sufficient to entitle them to a decree
enjoming the appellants from enforcing the first order
for, as insisted by appellants in oral argument in this
court, the challenged provisions are merely preliminary
steps in aid of investigations for the ascertainment of the
reasonableness of appellees' rates, and they have no binding force in respect of payments to the pipe line company
or rates to be charged consumers and cannot be res
adjudicata.iB
The inference seems clear that an affirmance of the commission's
order by the Kansas court could not render it res judicata, that
"2

F Supp. 792 (1933).

"Rev. Stat. Kansas, 1923, §66-113; Rev. Stat. Supp., 1931, §66-118".
"Supra, notes 25 and 27 and text thereto.
"Op. cit., supra, note 54, 569, 569-70. Note the position taken by the
commission. It would seem wiser in the long run to insist on finality
even if a few orders were reversed.
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too would be but an act of investigation preliminary to legislation. The case raises a very serious doubt as to the constitutionality
of those provisions of the Washington statutes making budget
orders conclusive in later rate litigation. There are, however,
other lines of approach which must be explored before a conclusion can be reached.
There is a clear distinction between the Wichita case and cases
like Terrace v. Thompson," Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 0 and
Nashville, Chattanooga & St. L. By. v. Wallace,6 in which the
constitutionality of statutes was adjudicated well in advance of
any actual interference with the plaintiffs. In the cases cited
the moment of legislation had passed, and the defendants were
officers under a mandatory duty to enforce the statutes against
the plaintiffs if the latter pursued their intended and usual courses
of action. The officers had no discretion, they were performing a
purely executive function. In the Wichita case no injury would
result to the plaintiff until further action of a legislative nature
was taken, the fixing of rates. The action of the district court
in enjoining the commission restrained the latter in the exercise
of its legislative function, something the Supreme Court has never
62
permitted.
It is more difficult to distinguish Fidelity Nat. Bank & T Co.
v Swope.6 3 A city charter provided that after the city council had
passed an ordinance authorizing an extensive street improvement project, it could bring an action to determine the validity of
charging the cost to those property-owners alleged to be benefited,
and if successful in this action, proceed to let contracts for the
completion of the project. The Supreme Court held that a decision in the state court in an action of this type was res judicata
as to the validity of the charge to the property, and barred a
property-owner from resisting the charge in federal court after
the improvement had been completed. It seems clear that the
268 U. S. 197, 44 Sup. Ct. 15 (1923), suit in federal court to enjoin

attorney-general of state from prosecuting plaintiff for executing a pro-

posed lease of land to an alien prohibited by statute, allegedly invalid,
from leasing such land.

268 U. S. 510, 45 Sup. Ct. 571 (1925), suit in federal court to enjoin
state officials from enforcing statute requiring all parents Ito send children to public schools, which statute was not yet in effect.

1288 U. S. 249, 53 Sup. Ct. 345 (1933), suit in state court under Uni-

form Declaratory Judgments Act for declaration that gasoline tax statute
is invalid as applied to plaintiff.
1 New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. New Orleans, 164 U. S. 471, 17 Sup.
Ct. 161 (1896) refusing to enjoin city council from passing unconstitutional ordinance; McChord v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 183 U. S. 483, 22 Sup.
Ct. 165 (1902), refusing to enjoin public service commission from fixing
rates under statute alleged to be unconstitutional.
274 U. S. 123, 47 Sup. Ct. 511 (1927).

PUBLIC UTILITY LEGISLATION
action of the city council in letting the contracts after the decision in the state court was purely an act of legislation. Whether
the project would be carried out or not was a matter solely within
the discretion of the city council, as much so, surely, as the decision by the commission in the Wichita case whether to adjust
rates or not. Moreover, this case is squarely in point on the problem under discussion whereas the Wichita case only holds that a
federal court should not interfere until the injury becomes more
imminent.
It seems impossible to find a valid factual distinction between the
two cases. 4 The likelihood of future legislation based on the preliminary finding is almost as strong in the Wichita case as in the
Swope case. The practical desirability of determining the validity
of the proposed assessments before contracts are let, money expended, or bonds issued is obviously great, but the advantages
resulting from the continuous and contemporaneous determination
of a utility company's operating expenses are by no means inconsiderable. In each case there was an actual controversy between
directly interested parties with well-defined issues.
It is submitted that one reason for the apparent inconsistency
of attitude on the part of the Supreme Court lies in the fact that
that tribunal, like all other courts, tends to divide the law into
insulated compartments.6 5 Utility cases are cited and followed as
precedents in utility cases, but not in municipal improvement
district cases-and vice versa-regardless of the fact that the
same fundamental problems may be presented in both types of
litigation. 6 Since the objection to applying the doctrine of res
judicata to preliminary orders in utility regulation is based on
general constitutional principles-separation of powers and due
process of law-which are equally applicable in the improvement
district cases, the Supreme Court would not depart from the rule
of stare dectsis if it should choose to follow the holding of the
Swope case rather than the dictum of the Prentis case and the
tnference of the Wichita case when the question is squarely presented in a utility ease."'
"The number of potential litigants is much greater in the Swope
case, but Ithis is merely a difference in degree, not of kind.
*'This is the natural, and on the whole desirable, result of the
multiplication of precedents which are closely in point. Cf. the infrequent citation of anything except insurance cases in insurance cases.
"The Prentis case was not cited in the Swope case, nor the Swope
case in the Wichita case.
" 'This is a situation where the compartments might be broken down
-where there are few precedents within the same field of litigation and
the doctrines involved are of broad application.
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The holding in the Swope case is based on the proposition that
the property-owners were not denied their day in the United
States Supreme Court on the question of due process, since an
appeal would have lain from the decision in the state court.,
Will the Supreme Court say the same thing where preliminary
orders issued by a public service commission are involved9 An
affirmative answer was predicted, by way of dictum and with
some doubt, by a three-judge federal court in Van Wert Gaslight
Co. v. Public Utilities Commissio. 9 Speaking of a preliminary
valuation order the court said, "Had this matter of valuation been
the subject of 3udicsal review in the Supreme Court of Ohio, and
such finding of the Public Utilities Commission upon this question
been affirmed, an estoppel by judgment would arise, which would
preclude the re-examination of this question in any other tribunal,
as between these same parties." 7 In anticipation of the objection
that to hold thus would deprive the utility company of its right
to carry all constitutional questions to the United States Supreme
Court because, since no question of confiscation could arise until
rates were regulated in reliance on the valuation order, no appeal
would lie from the decision of the Ohio court, the court intimated
that an appeal woidd lie, although expressing some doubt on the
point.7 '
The court possibly referred to an appeal based on a denial of
due process in the procedural sense. It nght be contended that
a federal question arises at once because the statute by making
unreversed valuation orders conclusive prohibits the commission
from considering other competent evidence as to value in a rate
proceeding and therefore denies to the utility company a "hear
ing" on that issue, since the state courts are limited to the record
made before the commission. This would be a good basis for an
appeal from a judgment affirming the validity of rates, "2 but
this very fact undermines the validity of the argument. If the
company can raise the question of the nature and sufficiency of
Op. cit., supra, note 63, 130-31.
00299 Fed. 670 (D. C., S. D., Ohio, 1924).
Ibid., 675. Italics in original. The court held that the doctrine of
res judicatawould not apply because the Ohio court had not tried the issue
of valuation de novo as required by Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon
Borough, 253 U. S. 287, 40 Sup. Ct. 527 (1920).
U Op.
cit., supra, note 69, 676.
' A rate order based on incompetent evidence is void as a violation
of the due process clause in the procedural sense. Northern P(ific R.
Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 268 U. S.39, 45 Sup. Ct. 412 (1925) This
holding, of course, would apply only where the reviewing court Is limited to the record made by the commission. In such cases the hearing
before the commission is an integral part of the judicial review. Of. note
47, supra.
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the evidence after the "moment of legislation is past", there is
no reason why the Supreme Court should pass on it before that
time. This line of approach really begs the whole question under
discussion.
If the dictum of the Van Wert case is to be followed, it must
be justified by a direct attack on the proposition that the issue
of confiscation is not raised until rates are changed. When a valuation or budget order is issued by a commission which is in fact
erroneous to the detriment of the company, the probability of
future confiscation due to the fixing of rates at too low a figure
is materially increased. When an order is issued reducing rates
73
at some future time the federal question arises at once, although
there can be no confiscation as yet, and whether there ever will
be is a matter of conjecture and opinion. The only difference in the
two situations is one of degree, the somewhat greater probability
in the second case that confiscation will occur. Therefore, if the
Supreme Court were to hold that it had jurisdiction to hear an
appeal from a state court's judgment affirming a valuation or
budget order, it would be taking but another step along a familiar
road. Nor would this step entail a departure from the holding in
the Wichita case.74 Obviously the likelihood that lower rates would
actually result from the order disallowing certain outlays as operating expense would be substantially greater after that order had
been affirmed by the state supreme court than before, and the
Court might logically "draw the line" between those points. All
in all, the precedents to the contrary are not so compelling as to
preclude the Supreme Court from treating as res judieata preliminary budget orders which have been judicially affirmed.
Before closing this discussion it should be pointed out that it is
very doubtful if the dictum in the Prentss case can be applied to
budget orders issued under the Washington statute. So far, prelinnary fact-finding orders have been considered solely as furnishing a basis for subsequent rate regulation. In Washington
such orders may also serve as the basis for dividend control. If
Mr. Justice Holmes' test is applied to proceedings looking to control of dividends, a different result is reached than where the
regulation of rates is the only objective.
When is the "moment of legislation" past2 The act of prohibiting the payment of dividends is not legislative but executive
- This seems to be taken for granted. Home Telephone & T. Co. v. Los
Angeles, 227 U. S. 278, 33 Sup. Ct. 312 (1913). Of. cases cited supra, notes
59, 60, 61.
"Supra, not e'4. The case merely held, that the danger of irreparable
Injury was not.q11fficiently imminent to warrant an injunction.
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in nature. The commission has no discretion under the statute. 5
It merely finds the facts and applies the law embodied in the
statute. If an earnings reserve has been set up it must be protected, that part of the earned surplus cannot be disbursed to
stockholders. Nor is the creation of an excess earnings reserve
an act of legislation. Once the Department has found as a fact
76
that excessive profit has been realized, it must set up the reserve.
True, the determination of what is a fair rate of return involves
the exercise of judgment, but it is not a legislative act under the
Blolmesian test since it looks only to the past and not to the
future.7 7 It is precisely the same kind of decision as that constantly made by the courts at common law in actions brought by
shippers to recover overcharges from carriers. It might be
described as a quasi-judicial act incident to execution.
The last legislative act then must be the issuance of the order
defining n advance the outlays which may be charged to operating
expense in calculating the net return of the utility company-the
budget order itself. By analogy to rate proceedings, the hearing
held before the budget order is issued may be regarded as the first
step in the judicial review of that order. Under this analysis the
immediate review in the state courts provided by the statutes will
be a purely judicial proceeding. The court's final decision will
be res judicata, and an appeal therefrom will lie to the United
States Supreme Court.7 8
Should the Supreme Court see fit to take this view of dividend
proceedings, it would regard the judicial affirmance of budget
orders as res judiicata in later rate litigation as well. The fact
that a budget order may be the basis of future legislative action
does not alter the fact that it is itself an act of legislation which,
coupled with the pertinent statutes, sanctions and enjoins executive
interference with the affairs of the utility company, without the
necessity or opportunity for further legislative action by the Department.
No one today seriously contends that some method of regulating
the rates charged by public utility compaies is not necessary for
the protection of the public. If regulation is necessary, a continuous system should be better than a spasmodic, intermittent
one. The use of preliminary orders and findings is a vital part of
1

Quoted supra, above note 12. Cf. note 23, supra.
Quoted supra, above note 11. Cf. note 22, supra.

11See Arzzona Grocery Co. v. Atchsson, T & S. F R. Co., supra, note 46.

Presumably the appeal could be based on a denial of due process to
the stockholder by withholding his dividends arbitrarily.
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the new system adopted m Washington. As a practical matter, a
device for rendering these orders and findings conclusive once and
for all must be available. Otherwise the new system will be little
more efficient than the old.
Immediate review of preliminary budget orders will cast no
new burden on the courts. The parties, the subject-matter, and
the questions of fact and law will be the same as in rate litigation. The differences will be that the issues will be narrower and
the evidence fresher. The objection that the courts should not
interfere until someone has been hurt runs against the current
of modern jurisprudence. More and more the trend is toward the
anticipation and prevention of injury7 9
The objection that a court should not entertain proceedings to
review preliminary administrative orders because in so doing it
would be aiding the administrative body in the performance of
a legislative function can be answered by saying that a court is
justified in performing any service for which it is fitted if the
public needs require it. The objection based on the due process
clause is equally untenable. To say that a utility company can
secure "justice" from a given group of judges if its rates have
been changed, but not otherwise, seems a conclusion of doubtful
validity, to say the least. The "tyranny of labels" 0 should not
be allowed to prevent the adaptation of old and well-tried judicial
machinery to new uses in an attempt to solve one of the most important and difficult governmental problems of modern times.
1 Witness the increasing use of declaratory judgments. On June 14,
1934, Congress -passed the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act. 48 Stat.
ch. 512.
,1"A fertile source of perversion in constitutional theory is the tyranny
of labels." Cardozo, J. m Snyder v. Mtsachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 114, 54
Sup. Ct. 330 (1934).

